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The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama Family
and Japanese-Choson˘ Korea Court Relations,
1455–1580s
Kenneth R. Robinson
A Japanese monk named Inshi Ryos¯hin traveled to Choson˘ Korea in 1473 as the
Vice-Envoy of the Shogun Deputy Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu. While in the capital,
Ryos¯hin submitted a personal letter to the Board of Rites (K. Yejo), the ministry
responsible for managing diplomatic interactions. He provided Korean officials
with information about the O– nin War (1467–1477) being fought in Kyoto, praised
Yoshikatsu’s  successes  at  peace-making  amid  the  battles,  and  explained  why
Yoshikatsu had been named Shogun Deputy (J. kanrei), the highest appointive post
below the Shogun.1) Yoshikatsu also communicated with the Board of Rites through
the official letter of introduction presented by his Envoy. And in addition to trading,
he asked for construction materials that would be used at a temple.2)
However, Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu never drew a breath. He was an imposter iden-
tity constructed for trading in Choson˘,3) and sent four missions between 1470 and
1480.4) Neither his father Yoshitada nor his younger cousin Yoshinari lived either,
and they also traded in Choson˘, from 1455 to 1460 and from 1460 to 1474, respec-
tively.5) And still more Hatakeyama missions appeared from 1548 until the Japanese
invasion of Choson˘ in 1592.6) While Korean elites knew that the later Hatakeyamas
were the handiwork of Tsushima islanders and thus somewhat less than authentic,
their predecessors seem not to have suspected or realized that any one or all three of
the earlier Hatakeyamas were designed. Those craftsmen most likely lived in the port
city of Hakata or in Tsushima, or in both places.
The Hatakeyama family that lived on Honshu was but one of several families asso-
ciated with the Muromachi Bakufu which were appropriated for imposter identities.
They were an especially good choice as a model. Related to the Ashikaga and eligible
for the Shogun Deputy post, family heads of the main branch were some of the most
powerful men in Kyoto and in the Bakufu.7) A second branch incorporated into the
identities of the imposter Hatakeyama, the Noto branch, served as governors of Noto
province. However, neither of these branches seems ever have to sent a mission to
Choson˘. Except for the Shiba,8) none among the other Bakufu official families with
whom the court interacted seem to have sent their own missions, either.
The King of Choson˘ recognized these several families associated with the Muro-
machi Bakufu as “Bakufu officials” (K. koc˘h’u, taeshin; J. daijin). This diplomatic
status placed the officials below only shoguns and kings in the court’s tightly calibrat-
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ed reception procedures, and provided perquisites unavailable to Japanese contacts
assigned to lower diplomatic statuses. For example, the King bestowed reception
upon Bakufu officials without a prior review of their letters of introduction. That is,
the court considered them representatives of the Shogun (K. t’ongshin; J. tsus¯hin).
Further, according to written regulations, while the Choson˘ court limited the volume
of goods which Japanese of lower reception grades could transport to Hanson˘g, the
capital, for official trade, the court did not impose similar limits upon Bakufu offi-
cials.8) Seeking to take advantage of this status, imposter Bakufu officials dispatched
numerous missions during the O– nin War and, treating the Choson˘ government as a
supply depot, asked for large amounts of cotton and other cloths, Buddhist sutras, and
temple construction materials.11) In other words, a Hakata elite or a Tsushima islander
could conduct far more trade and, presumably make more profits during one mission
at the Bakufu official status than at his own diplomatic status.
Most of the goods which Japanese traded in Choson˘ were southeast Asian products
such as spices, dyes, and medicines obtained in Ryukyu, Hakata, and possibly else-
where in Kyushu. In exchange, Japanese acquired cotton, silk, other cloths, and food-
stuffs. Korean pottery, including tea wares, may also have been popular. Another
reason why Japanese sailed as frequently as possible to Choson˘ was that the Ming
court forbade official trade that was not conducted through a shogunal tribute mis-
sion. Just a few hours away in Choson˘ were opportunities available year-round.
Privileges  and  purposes  such  as  these  encouraged  the  reconstitution  of  the
Hatakeyama. Sponsors of the identities active in the mid-fifteenth century operate and
trade within the regulations for Bakufu officials until 1474/12, when the Choson˘ court
introduced the ivory tally system to prevent further missions from imposter Bakufu
officials. Subsequently, they and sponsors in the mid-and late-sixteenth century
searched for ways to remove the Hatakeyama from the ivory tally system. A family
history of the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama will tell of men who never lived,
their interactions with Korean kings and court officials, and reactions of the Choson˘
court to imposter trade.
The Main Branch and the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama
The branches of the Hatakeyama that unknowingly provided the models for the
imposter Hatakeyama lived originally in the Kanto ¯area. After several family mem-
bers were killed in a dispute with the Hoj¯o ¯in the early thirteenth century, the lineage
was renewed through the marriage of the family head’s widow to the first, illegitimate
son of the Ashikaga family head. As the Ashikaga constructed the Muromachi Baku-
fu in the mid-fourteenth century, they included the Hatakeyama among collateral
families eligible for appointment as Shogun Deputy and appointed the family head to
the governorships for Kawachi, Kii, Etchu,¯ and Noto provinces.
In 1408, the Hatakeyama family head passed the appointment to the Noto gover-
norship to his younger brother. With that new Governor, Mitsunori, began the Noto
branch of the Hatakeyama. This branch did not supply Shogun Deputies, however,
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because eligibility remained with the main branch.
Matters grew complicated for the main branch from mid-century. Mochikuni, the
heirless family head, adopted as his son and successor a child, Masanaga. Soon,
though, one of Mochikuni’s ladies bore him a son, Yoshinari. After retiring in 1450,
Mochikuni tried to transfer the succession to Yoshinari. However, the Hatakeyama
succession became enmeshed in wider disputes, including succession contests in oth-
er elite families. (The Noto branch supported Yoshinari.) (See Genealogy 1.) Compe-
tition between the brothers escalated into armed conflict in the 1460s as Masanaga
chased Yoshinari through nearby provinces. Masanaga continued to fare far better
than his brother, and served as Shogun Deputy at four different times between 1464/
9 and 1487/8.10) I shall return to Yoshinari and his own activities in the 1470s and
1480s below. Against this too brief summary of the main branch and the Noto branch
of the Hatakeyama will emerge the composition and activities of the imposter branch.
Genealogy 1: The Main Branch and the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama during the Fifteenth Century
Motokuni (Uemon-no-suke)
[Main branch] [Noto branch]
Mitsuie (Saemon-no-kami) Mitsunori (Shur¯i-no-daibu)
Mochikuni (Saemon-no-kami) Yoshitada (Shur¯i-no-daibu)
Masanaga (Saemon-no-kami) Yoshinari (Uemon-no-suke) Yoshiari (Jibu-no-shou)
Motoie (Danjo-¯no-shohitsu) Yoshimune (Saemon-no-suke)
Sources: Imatani Akira, “Hatakeyama-uji,” in Imatani Akira and Fujieda Fumitada, eds., Muromachi
Bakufu shugoshokka jiten, ge, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu or¯aisha, 1988), 270–272; Higashiyotsuyanagi
Fumiaki, “Noto Hatakeyama-uji,” in O– yama Takeshi and Owada Tetsuo, eds., Sengoku daimyo¯ keifu
jinmei jiten: Saigoku hen, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu or¯aisha, 1986), 61.
Genealogy 2: A Genealogy of the Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama
the founder of Tokuhonji
Yoshitada = Mochikuni
Yoshikatsu Yoshinari
(Sakyo-¯no-daibu) (Ukingo-no-kami)
Yoshiaki = Haruhide
(Ukingo-no-kami) (Hyoe¯-no-kami)
Legend: = signifies a relationship as brothers, the elder brother being to the left.
The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama, 1455–1480:
Yoshitada, Yoshinari, and Yoshikatsu
Yoshikatsu was one of three imposter Hatakeyama who traded in Choson˘ between
1455 and 1480. His father Yoshitada had initiated contact in 1455, his younger cousin
Yoshinari in 1460.11) (See Genealogy 2.) The designers of these identities mixed and
matched the names, genealogies, personal experiences, government posts, and court
titles of men in the main branch and the Noto branch of the Hatakeyama, and crafted
these contacts in ways that enabled diplomatic and trade relations to continue for
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many years. The most important elements were the contacts’ family names and gov-
ernment positions. The family name reminded Korean officials of the Hatakeyama’s
position in the Bakufu as Shogun Deputy, and the political status determined their
diplomatic status and reception procedures. All three of these Hatakeyama served as
Shogun Deputy.
Among the more than one-half dozen Bakufu families appropriated and reconsti-
tuted for imposter trade, Hatakeyama missions arrived most often. Working through
Yoshitada,  Yoshinari,  and  Yoshikatsu,  the  designers  and  sponsors  crafted  a
Hatakeyama branch. They formed two lines of succession, linked family members,
and established succession patterns. The imposter branch worked parallel to the two
Hatakeyama branches from which the identities were drawn. But the activities of the
imposter branch never precluded or prevented other Hatakeyama from seeking diplo-
matic relations with the King of Choson˘.
As noted, the first imposter Hatakeyama mission, sent by the Shogun Deputy
Hatakeyama Yoshitada, reached Hanson˘g in late 1455.12) The imposter branch Yosh-
itada was the elder uterine brother of Mochikuni.13) Shogun Deputy missions, which
presumably were Hatakeyama missions traveling under the name of Yoshitada, trad-
ed several more times through 1460. No further Yoshitada missions are recorded after
this year.14)
Although Korean officials were unsuspecting, the Shogun Deputy Hatakeyama
Yoshitada would have attracted attention in Kyoto. The Yoshitada who could circu-
late in Kyoto was the son of Mitsunori, the founder of the Noto branch. He succeeded
to the family headship and to the Noto governorship after Mitsunori’s death. In 1455,
the year when the imposter branch Yoshitada initiated diplomatic relations with the
King of Choson˘, the Noto branch Yoshitada retired and passed the family headship to
his grandson.15)
Even more problematic, Hosokawa Katsumoto served as Shogun Deputy from
1452/11 until 1464/9, or throughout the entire period that Yoshitada traded in
Choson˘. The Shogun Deputy before Katsumoto, though, was Hatakeyama Mochiku-
ni. And as Shogun Deputy in 1443/6, Mochikuni met with Korean envoys visiting
Kyoto.16) This embassy having been the last to reach the Japanese capital before the
introduction of imposter Bakufu officials to the King of Choson˘, “Hatakeyama” and
“Shogun Deputy” probably was a combination recognizable to court officials.17) Per-
haps this memory in Choson˘ and knowledge elsewhere of that memory led to the
selection of Hatakeyama as the first family to be deployed for an imposter trade mis-
sion under the name of a Bakufu official. As for Mochikuni, he died in 1455/3, almost
nine months before the Korean king received Yoshitada’s envoy.18) Yoshitada of the
Noto branch died in 1463;19) Yoshitada of the imposter branch died in 1465.20)
The imposter branch Yoshitada was a composite of the two Honshu branches. His
adult given name matched that of his contemporary in Noto. But the court title which
he sported, Shur¯i-no-daibu, had been bestowed upon Mitsunori, not upon the Noto
branch Yoshitada. The imposter Yoshitada also claimed the Shogun Deputy post for
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which the Noto branch was not eligible. And genealogically, the imposter branch
Yoshitada was the uterine brother of Mochikuni. But the Noto branch Yoshitada was
Mochikuni’s uncle. Further, the imposter Yoshitada was the uncle of the imposter
branch Yoshinari, whose name matched that of a member of the main branch. The
family of the imposter branch Yoshitada thus differed significantly from the family of
the Noto branch Yoshitada. (Compare Genealogy 1 and Genealogy 2.)
The next Hatakeyama to send missions was Yoshinari. His first contact with the
Choson˘ court occurred in 1460, when the Korean king received his envoy and the
envoy of Yoshitada together. Like Yoshitada, Yoshinari’s profile also combined fea-
tures from the Honshu branches. As did his predecessor, Yoshinari held both the Sho-
gun Deputy position and the governorship of Noto province. He also held the gover-
norships for Yamashiro, Kawachi, Kii, and Etchu ¯provinces, government posts that
the Bakufu distributed to the main branch.21) Four more Yoshinari missions reached
Choson˘ through 1474/7.22)
The Choson˘ court understood Yoshinari to be the son of Mochikuni, the nephew of
Yoshitada, and the younger cousin of Yoshikatsu. As noted already, the main branch
Yoshinari also was the son of Mochikuni. However, unlike Yoshinari of the imposter
branch, he did not have a uterine brother. Moreover, he was never appointed Shogun
Deputy. (Again compare Genealogy 1 and Genealogy 2.) And although early in his
career he held the governorships for Kawachi, Kii, Etchu,¯ and Yamato, again unlike
the imposter branch Yoshinari, he is not known to have held the governorship for
Noto.
Yoshinari also approached the court for assistance in rebuilding a temple. In 1474,
he sought help for Tokuhonji, a temple that his grandfather had established but which
had burned in the fighting. But the court refused his entreaty.23) The name chosen for
this temple, Tokuhonji, derived not from the grandfather of the imposter branch
Yoshinari, but from the father of the main branch Yoshinari. That father, Mochikuni,
assumed the religious name Tokuhon upon taking the tonsure in 1454. An imposter
identity thus was asking for materials for a temple that did not exist and that was
founded by a grandfather who never lived. This was the last appearance of Yoshinari.
Korean officials did not know that the lifecourses of the two Yoshinaris differed
remarkably in the 1460s and 1470s. While the imposter branch Yoshinari bragged
about his peaceful, religious pursuits amid the wars then consuming much of Japan,
the main branch Yoshinari remained committed to defeating his adoptive brother
Masanaga. As briefly described above, Yoshinari and Masanaga each had at different
times been announced by Mochikuni as the successor to the family headship. They
continued to vie for the headship after their father’s death in 1455. In 1460/9, as their
skirmishes neared Kyoto, the Shogun banished Yoshinari from the capital. Several
military defeats followed, and by 1463 Yoshinari was roaming homeless through
nearby provinces. Meanwhile, Masanaga was appointed Shogun Deputy in 1464/9
through the support and machinations of Hosokawa Katsumoto, and held the office
until 1467/1. As H. Paul Varley writes, “The goal [the family headship] for which
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both Hatakeyama contenders were fighting so desperately had become, in terms of
real power, meaningless; for the Hatakeyama were no longer masters of their own
fate.”24)
The Hatakeyama did not control their identities, either. The economic and political
destitution of the main branch Yoshinari in the mid-1460s made sharp contrast with
the imposter branch Yoshinari’s position in 1465 as Shogun Deputy. Further, the im-
poster branch Yoshinari’s claim to the Shogun Deputy post in 1465 conflicted with
the appointment of Masanaga, who was the Shogun Deputy at that time.
The next Hatakeyama to deal with the Choson˘ court was Yoshikatsu, the elder
cousin of the imposter branch Yoshinari. Also the Shogun Deputy, Yoshikatsu sent
his first mission in 1470. Hoping to leave a good impression, he presented to the
Korean king such rarities as a water buffalo and sweet honey.25) The envoy returned to
Japan with sutras and various cloths.26)
Like his predecessors, the Shogun Deputy whose envoys met with Korean kings
and high-ranking officials in the early 1470s could not claim in Kyoto to be the Sho-
gun Deputy. In Yoshikatsu’s case, Hosokawa Katsumoto’s second stint began in
1468/7 and ended when he died on 1473/5/11. The post remained vacant for seven
months, until Masanaga served for one week in the twelfth month. No one occupied
the post for the next four years.27)
Yoshikatsu’s second mission, which included Ryos¯hin, arrived in 1473. The Envoy
was the Abbot of Tentokuji, a Zen temple in Noto province. This mission followed a
common practice in Japanese-Choson˘ court interactions. Provincial governors asked
the Choson˘ court to provide sutras or other materials for temples in their provinces.
Yoshikatsu asked for assistance in building a sutra depository at Tentokuji, where he
would place the Koryo ˘Tripitaka volumes (K. ilbu) that King Son˘gjong had released
in 1470.27) However, there was no Tentokuji in Noto province in the late fifteenth
century.28) As the imposter branch Yoshinari would do for Tokuhonji in 1474, an
imposter identity sought materials for a temple that did not exist.
Son˘gjong received Yoshikatsu’s next mission in 1474/12. The timing of this audi-
ence requires explanation. Two months earlier, in 1474/10, the Shogun Ashikaga
Yoshimasa had exposed two imposter Bakufu officials.29) To prevent further abuses,
Yoshimasa proposed that an identification system for shogunal envoys and envoys of
Bakufu officials be implemented. Two months later, Son˘gjong instituted a different
system founded not in Japan but in Choson˘. He entrusted with the shogun the right
halves of 10 ivory tallies numbered respectively 1 through 10. Each tally was in-
scribed on one side with the phrase Choson˘ t’ongshin (J. Chos¯en tsus¯hin) and on the
other side with the Chinese reign year equivalent to 1474. Most important, Son˘gjong
required all envoys of shoguns and of Bakufu officials to obtain an ivory tally from
the shogun and present that patent in Choson˘.30) Son˘gjong received the envoy of
Yoshikatsu about one week after instituting the ivory tally regulation. This mission
thus could not have been bound by the addition to the court’s access control system.
Hereafter, though, Hatakeyama missions were to pass through the Shogun. The
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Choson˘ court had endowed the King’s diplomatic equal with a means to oversee de-
partures for Choson˘, a power over western elites which the Ashikaga, the office of the
Shogun, and the Muromachi Bakufu had never developed. Until a detour could be
devised, the ivory tally system discouraged the allocation of financial and material
resources for missions likely not to achieve recognition. The ivory tally system also
rendered such dispatches even more dangerous, for it increased the possibility of ex-
posure in Japan and the unpredictable consequences that might follow.
And yet, Yoshikatsu squeezed another mission into Choson˘ in 1480. That the en-
voy did not present an ivory tally is clear from the usage in 1482 of tally number one
by Yoshimasa’s envoy.32) Serving again as the Shogun Deputy, he associated himself
with the “leader of the Western army” (J. saishu) in the O– nin War, Yoshimi. He sited
himself and his relations with the King of Choson˘ in the Shogun’s tributary relation-
ship with the Emperor of Ming China. And he hinted at problems with the introduc-
tion of the ivory tally identification system. But this mission sought something more
important than trade.
In his letter Yoshikatsu referred first to that recent embassy. It seems that the envoy
had not been able to return through the Inland Sea because of the war and instead had
proceeded along the western coast of Honshu. Encountering bad weather, the ship
sailed off course, as far north as “the country of the northern barbarians” (J. hokuteki-
no-kuni).33) Only “last year” did he learn of the envoy’s whereabouts. A ship was
immediately dispatched to bring the envoy and the King’s letter and gifts to Kyoto.
Concerned about the letter and the gifts, Yoshikatsu asked Son˘gjong to tell him the
contents of the letter so that he could relay the information to Yoshimi.34)
The Shogun Deputy then mentioned two shogunal tribute missions to China. The
first had recently returned to Japan; the second would soon be departing. However,
the author of the letter was careful not to use wording other than “leader of the West-
ern army” to identify Yoshimi. It was the associations with the embassy to Choson˘
and the tribute missions to China that expressed his status as Son˘gjong’s diplomatic
equal in Japan.
In that first shogunal tribute mission, Ryos¯hin served as Vice-Envoy. According to
Yoshikatsu, while returning from China the ship carrying the monk strayed off-course
and landed at Cheju island. Discovering the Japanese, islanders bound Ryos¯hin and
others and marched them to a nearby government office. However, Ryos¯hin died
while in the charge of Cheju officials. At this point in the letter Yoshikatsu climbed to
diplomatic high ground. He reminded the court that shipwrecked people were to be
protected and returned (alive, it went without saying) to their home country. Thus, he
could not understand why officials in Cheju did not report Ryos¯hin’s appearance to
the Board of Rites, particularly as the monk had visited Choson˘ in the past.
Hashimoto  Yu ¯ suggests  that  the  embassy  returning  from  Choson˘  to  which
Yoshikatsu referred was the 1474 embassy whose envoy Son˘gjong had entrusted with
the ivory tallies. Yoshikatsu, or rather his handlers, wanted to leave the impression
that the ivory tallies had been lost. He then deployed this loss as the excuse for seek-
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ing reception without an ivory tally.41)
Wanting information about the contents of Son˘gjong’s letter to Yoshimasa helps
explain the dispatch of the Hatakeyama mission and the themes, including the danger-
ous Inland Sea passage and the Chinese tribute system, deployed in Yoshikatsu’s
letter. Through that carefully worded letter, Yoshikatsu’s handlers probably hoped to
nudge the King of Choson˘ into issuing another set of tallies and entrusting that set
with their envoy. Had Son˘gjong done so, the difficulties of using this second set
would have struck its holders eventually. How would they dispatch a second embassy
after Yoshimasa had used his first tally and his envoy convinced the court of that
embassy’s authenticity? The various tactics utilized in this Yoshikatsu mission dem-
onstrate the importance for some in western Japan of imposter Bakufu officials.
That importance also informed the earlier revival of contact in the Yoshitada line in
1470 after 10 years of inactivity. At that time, the conflagration in Kyoto had made it
easier for sponsors to prepare and dispatch these imposter trade missions.42) Further,
upon his bestowal of recognition, the King of Choson˘ inaugurated a form of trade
succession similar to and also significantly different from trade successions conduct-
ed by or through Japanese assigned to the lowest diplomatic status. In the latter pat-
tern, a Japanese contact returned the personal seal which had been bestowed upon his
predecessor and requested and received a seal in his own name. For a Bakufu official,
though, trade succession occurred automatically, because access and reception did
not require possession of a personal seal.
Two lines within the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama, the Yoshitada-Yoshikat-
su line and the Yoshinari line, now were interacting with the Choson˘ court. By estab-
lishing parallel succession tracks the sponsors (whether one group or two) of the
Yoshikatsu and Yoshinari identities increased the frequency of contact in Choson˘ and
the volume of trade and amount of profits in both Choson˘ and Japan. Those lines
might have continued trading in Choson˘ had Yoshimasa not exposed the trading prac-
tice which the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama embodied and the court not insti-
tuted the ivory tally system.
Even as late as 1480, then, the Choson˘ court still may not have identified the
Hatakeyama as imposter Bakufu officials. And the court twice missed opportunities
to meet Bakufu officials in the late 1470s. In late 1476-early 1477 and again in early
1479, for example, the court prepared embassies to Japan. On both occasions,
“Hatakeyama-dono” was among the men to whom Son˘gjong’s envoys were to deliver
gifts.43) But neither of these embassies reached Kyoto, and the court thus did not col-
lect up-to-date information about politics in Kyoto and elsewhere in Japan. Mean-
while, Yoshikatsu missions stopped arriving because they could not obtain tallies
from Yoshimasa or from the Choson˘ court. Other imposter Bakufu officials not di-
rectly implicated in 1474 also stopped sending missions. The ivory tally system was
working well.
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The Hatakeyama and the Choson˘ Court, 1548–1580s
The imposter branch of the Hatakeyama suddenly reappeared in 1548. The year
before, King Myon˘gjong had permitted Japanese to resume trade following a destruc-
tive pirate attack in 1544 and the severing of relations. One of the purposes in renew-
ing contact through imposter Bakufu officials, trade, did not differ from those of ear-
lier generations.44) By 1552 at the latest, Korean officials strongly suspected that
Tsushima islanders were responsible for the Hatakeyama missions at minimum.
Kings and court officials understood thereafter that they were dealing with imposter
Hatakeyama contacts representing interests in Tsushima.
The dispatch of imposter Bakufu officials also worked toward purposes which re-
minded Korean elites that Tsushima islanders all but subsisted on their trade in
Choson˘ and Japan. These later Hatakeyama contacts, for example, added negotiating
for trade privileges to their diplomatic portfolio and endeavored to increase trade op-
portunities for Tsushima islanders. Their missions contributed to the belief among
some, if not many Korean officials that “Japanese have many deceptions and their
words lack credibility.”45)
When Myon˘gjong unlocked the door to trade in 1547, he opened that door less
widely than it had been in the past. The court reduced the number of trade ships
allotted the Governor of Tsushima each year and prohibited the usage of personal
seals issued more than 50 years earlier.46) How many people and identities were de-
nied diplomatic privileges by the latter restriction, and how many trade ships per year
were thus eliminated, is unclear. The elimination of those personal seals enhanced the
value of Bakufu officials and that diplomatic status, for these identities did not require
seals for access. None of the articles in the 1547 agreement, though, referred to Baku-
fu officials, which may have contributed to their revival in 1548.47) Interaction
through Bakufu officials offered the potential of loosening the new rules of contact
and replenishing Tsushima islanders with trade ships.
That first Hatakeyama envoy, apparently as Yoshitada’s representative, arrived in
1548 with a shogunal envoy and without an ivory tally. This breach prompted
My|ngjong to not bestow diplomatic recognition and to bid the envoy return home.48)
This mission may have been testing whether the ivory tally regulation remained in
effect and if Yoshitada still was a viable identity, and at the same time may have been
seeking a route to Choson˘ that did not pass through the holder of an ivory tally. This
gambit of accompanying a shogunal envoy thus offered the possibility of becoming
an accepted, regular practice. However, shogunal escort proved insufficient for by-
passing the ivory tally requirement.
The planners learned quickly. Two years later, in 1550, the Hatakeyama envoy
presented four forms of identification: an ivory tally; a letter from the Shogun; a letter
of introduction from Hatakeyama; and an access permit (K. munin).49) The tally re-
quirement met, the King bestowed reception according to regulations current in the
mid-fifteenth century. That reception protocol presumably continued to extend to the
amount of goods a Bakufu official’s envoy could transport to the capital. If so, trade
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conducted through Bakufu officials still exceeded, at least on paper, the volume of
trade permitted Japanese of lower diplomatic statuses.
Hatakeyama also made a request of the court. He wished to be issued a “small
tally” (J. shofu; K. sobu) which he could present instead of a shogunal tally. The court
turned down the petition. Had the King and his officials approved, they would have
liberated a Bakufu official from the ivory tally regulation and established a precedent
for access and reception. Similar to Yoshikatsu’s enlistment of Japanese tributary
relations with Ming China in 1480, these attempts in 1548 and 1550 at recasting ac-
cess control policies would not have been necessary had tallies been easily available.
The problem of obtaining an ivory tally raises the questions of why this (and the 1548)
mission was a Hatakeyama mission, how the tally presented in 1550 came into the
hands of the sponsors, and what number tally did the Envoy carry.
The answers are not yet known. But in 1503–1504, the Shogun Ashikaga Yoshi-
zumi asked the King of Choson˘ for a new set of ivory tallies. Hashimoto suggests that
the court replied favorably. Tallies numbered 1 and 2 were available to the O– tomo,
who administered an important port area in Hakata, in the first half of the 1520s; a
tally numbered 4 was in the hands of the O– uchi in 1542–1543 and in 1562 with the
Mor¯i, after the O– uchi’s demise.50) And in 1552, an imposter Bakufu official presented
a tally numbered 3.51) The issuance for Yoshizumi can be confirmed: in 1550, court
officials referred to the requirement that envoys of shoguns and Bakufu officials carry
the left half of an ivory tally.52) Assuming that the Choson˘ court fully followed proce-
dures outlined at the time of the Shogun’s request, this set differed from the tallies
produced in 1474. The court inscribed into each tally the Chinese reign year in which
they were issued and entrusted the left halves with Yoshizumi’s envoy.53) Korean
officials thus could easily distinguish the new patents from the first set.
Still, the network through which the tally used in 1550 passed remains shrouded.
Hashimoto also suggests that elites in western Japan sought to move closer to the
shogunal power that enabled interaction through an ivory tally, regardless of who
actually held a tally or tallies.54) That specific form of shogunal power attached to
whomever the King of Choson˘ recognized diplomatically as Shogun, but, conversely,
was moot without royal recognition. A separate, personal tally for Hatakeyama would
have distanced these missions from whatever complications attended an approach to
the holder of an ivory tally or the repetitive use of a single tally by one or more
imposter Bakufu officials.
Back in Hanson˘g, Hatakeyama’s Envoy died in the capital. Even as Korean offi-
cials were making plans for his burial, the quick-thinking Vice-Envoy asked the court
to bestow a post in the Choson˘ military bureaucracy upon the Envoy’s nephew so that
he could mourn at the grave every year. More to the point in, fulfilling the requirement
that post recipients offer their respects to the King every year, the military post would
provide an annual opportunity for trade. As with personal seals, Japanese had pursued
this manner of access since the mid-fifteenth century. However, the court turned
down the petition.55) The Vice-Envoy returned to Japan without the Envoy, without a
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personal tally for Hatakeyama, and without a new military post.
A third mission reached Chos|n in 1552.56) Korean officials became suspicious of
Hatakeyama, and for a very simple reason. This Envoy had served in recent missions.
Stated the Censor-General (K. Saganwon˘) bluntly,
The true character of the Japanese (K. Waenu) is one of
deceit. They know only profiteering by deception and
do not understand integrity (K. shinui˘).
. . . Recently, the Envoy and the Vice-Envoy of the
Shogun of Japan, the Envoy of  O– uchi, and the
Envoy of Hatakeyama have come [to Choson˘].
At each mission we have strongly doubted [the envoys’
authenticity]. We believe that the envoys
were Tsushima Japanese who secretly obtained
tallies (K. puhom˘) and came [to Choson˘]. They
deceive our country and seek only profits.57)
Several years later, in 1560, a member of the Hatakeyama tried yet again to free the
family, and thus the sponsor of Hatakeyama identities, from the ivory tally system. In
addition to the request for a new form of identification, Hatakeyama Yoshikata sought
to add a second line of access and trade for the family.58) He asked the court to reward
his “younger brother Haruhide” with a personal seal for having returned a Choson˘
government seal (K. inshin) stolen by pirates, an act which added to the merit Haru-
hide had earned a few years earlier when he warned of approaching pirates. And for
himself, this time Yoshikata sought a seal to replace the ivory tally. He justified the
request thusly: “Every time I send an envoy, I must receive an ivory tally from the
shogun and then (the envoy may) come, and I am concerned that the tally could be lost
(en route). I request to receive a copper seal (J. doi¯n).”
Again, an imposter identity received as a Bakufu official was asking the Choson˘
court to release him from an identification system that had been established to prevent
trade missions by imposter Bakufu official. The irony probably was not lost on Kore-
an officials. As they had done in 1550 and 1552, Myon˘gjong and his officials refused
the petition for a separate means of access. But, the investment of imagination paid
off as Myon˘gjong bestowed a personal seal upon Haruhide.
This success rippled in several directions. First, Myon˘gjong and his officials re-
vived the practice of issuing personal seals. Second, Tsushima elites added one more
ship to the number that could be sent each year. Third, as in the mid-fifteenth century,
the Choson˘ court assigned that seal recipient to the lowest diplomatic status. Fourth,
the court released a seal to a contact that was a relative several generations removed
from Yoshinari of the imposter branch.59) And fifth, the court granted not a personal
request but a request on behalf of someone of a lower diplomatic status.
Haruhide’s success in gaining regular access through the return of Choson˘ govern-
ment property provided a model for another imposter identity, Noritada, the Governor
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of Iojima (E. Iwo Jima). In 1562 and 1565, Noritada returned Korean weapons and
military manuals. He requested a personal seal in 1562 and both a seal and a nominal
post in 1565. As the Board of Rites noted on the second occasion, Noritada sought
trade privileges through meritorious deeds. Both attempts failed, however.60) The
warning of a Korean official in 1560 after learning that Haruhide would return a gov-
ernment seal thus rang true: if the court rewards a Japanese on this occasion, who can
predict what they will try next?61)
Yoshikata finally achieved his goal in 1563 when, through the good offices of an
imposter shogun, the court released him from the ivory tally regulation.62) That year,
Myon˘gjong bestowed personal seals upon ten Japanese contacts.63) Whether Yoshika-
ta received his personal seal separately or among these ten, though, is not clear. Re-
gardless, the Haruhide issuance seems to have become a precedent. And as kings and
court officials reached that decision to revive trade through personal seals, they prob-
ably entered the piracy of 200 years earlier and of the past 20 years into their calcula-
tions.
With the imposter shogun ís success in gaining the release of the Yoshikata seal, a
calculus of seal request and issuance can be confirmed in Choson˘ court policy of this
time. A Japanese elite could gain the release of a personal seal for a contact of a lower
diplomatic status, but not for himself (or, theoretically, for someone of his own diplo-
matic status). Such considerations might also have informed the refusals to the Gov-
ernor of Iojima. Further, in freeing this Bakufu official from the ivory tally regulation
the court constricted to the Shogun successful requests for revision of this policy. The
“Shogun” continued to negotiate on behalf of Bakufu officials even after the Muro-
machi Bakufu had its tent folded in 1573, as when the king bestowed a personal seal
upon Kyog¯oku Haruhiro, another imposter identity, in 1581.64) Leaders in Tsushima
understood well how to improve their chances as the court made foreign policy deci-
sions.
As they replenished trade opportunities the So ¯family in Tsushima distributed per-
sonal seals such as those provided the Hatakeyama brothers and military post appoint-
ment notices to islander elites.65) For example, the So ¯allowed the Tateishi, a retainer
family related by marriage, to use the Hatakeyama seals between at least 1573 and
1586. The Tateishi also traded through a third imposter Bakufu official identity.66) The
successes of the Shogun and Yoshikata were successes for the So.¯
In early 1573 Yoshikata negotiated again with the Choson˘ court. He raised issues
that the So ¯had broached earlier with the King of Choson˘ through the Hatakeyama and
through an imposter Shogun in 1562–1563 and again in 1567.67)  In short, Yoshikata
was continuing negotiations most likely initiated by the So.¯
The Bakufu official presented five requests. First, Yoshikata asked the court to
allow Haruhide and nine other Japanese contacts to each send two trade ships each
year, as per the regulations of one century earlier. Second, he sought diplomatic rec-
ognition for Norizane and seven other Japanese. These eight identities probably were
the same eight to whom the court had refused to provide personal seals and trade
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privileges in 1563 and in 1567, when the court chose not to recognize “the so-called
Norizane” and seven others. Third, he forwarded another request for a military post
appointment. Fourth was a request that a small temple affiliated with Kenninji trade
for objects that would improve its facilities. (Kenninji was a Rinzai Zen temple in
Kyoto that had been close to the Ashikaga.) And fifth, Yoshikata did not forget his
family. Planning ahead for future trade, he introduced at least the next generation by
asking for a falcon for his son(s) and grandson(s) (J. shison; K. chason).68)
This time, Yoshikata negotiated only for Japanese whom the court already had or
hopefully would assign to the lowest diplomatic status. In other words, Yoshikata
practiced the representational request that the court had accepted one decade earlier.
The result of each request this time is not known with certainty. But Yoshikata, and
the So,¯ apparently failed to expand trade privileges for the nine personal seal recipi-
ents, to gain trade privileges for the eight that the court had refused a few years earlier,
and to obtain another military post appointment.
Haruhide and Yoshikata continued trading into at least the mid-1580s, but little is
known about these missions. Their activities came to a halt, though, when Toyotomi
Hideyoshi’s armies invaded Choson˘ in 1592. When court officials introduced new
diplomatic and trade regulations in 1609, they closed the door to imposter Bakufu
officials and their offspring.69)
Conclusion
The Hatakeyama who traded in Choson˘ were like many other Japanese, imposter
and otherwise, who dispatched missions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They
held administrative posts in the provinces or positions in the Muromachi Bakufu.
They contributed to the chaos of the  O– nin War. They supported Buddhist institutions,
asked Korean kings for Buddhist sutras, and selected monks to be their envoys. And
they traded across generations, even passing a character, yoshi, from father to son.
But like other imposter identities, members of the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama
did not exist outside of Japanese-Choson˘ court diplomacy and the interests of the
Japanese elites involved in the creation and dispatch of their missions. Stated differ-
ently, the Hatakeyama could trade in Choson˘ but they could not trade in Japan.
The diplomatic matrix through which Bakufu officials traveled after 1547 enabled
the So ¯to channel their voice and their interests through an identity whose markings
qualified him for a higher diplomatic status, a higher level of reception, and a broader
range of interactions. Imposter shogunal missions performed a similar role. Seeking
to satisfy various interests, the Hatakeyama and their envoys were not shy about tell-
ing falsehoods and half-truths or pressuring the court, especially where a sponsor
could not make such statements or act in such a manner under his own name. To
paraphrase Cornelius J. Kiley, disparity of diplomatic status permitted the exercise of
complementary diplomatic functions.70)
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu and his immediate relatives stand out for their large num-
ber of missions compared to other imposter Bakufu officials and for not being detect-
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ed by Korean elites. On the other hand, Yoshiaki and the Buddhist monks who spoke
for him (and for the So,¯ and possibly for others, as well) often achieved what Japanese
elites in the western provinces could not during the second half of the sixteenth centu-
ry. Following upon the trade restrictions imposed in 1547, his success in negotiating
the issuance of a personal seal to a contact that would be assigned to the lowest diplo-
matic status prompted requests for more personal seals. The issuances in 1563 and
1567 significantly increased the number of identities through which Tsushima island-
ers could trade with the Choson˘ court, the number of trade opportunities available for
islanders each year, and the volume of trade that has islanders could conduct in
Choson˘ and in Japan. Hatakeyama Yoshikata, unknown though he must have been in
much of Japan, has been overlooked in the histories of Japanese foreign relations and
Japanese-Choson˘ court relations in the late sixteenth century.
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Appendix: Ryos¯hin’s Letter to the Board of Rites
Inshi Ryos¯hin, the monk who represented Yoshikatsu as Vice-Envoy in 1473, also was a medical
specialist and perhaps even a poet. Among other gifts which he presented to the Choson˘ court was a
medical text, one which eventually found its way back to Japan. His experience in an earlier shogunal
tribute mission to China may have contributed to his selection for service in the name of an imposter
Bakufu official. Being from Noto province was another useful attribute when representing the Hatakeya-
ma.1)
Ryos¯hin presented his letter on the day of the Envoy’s audience with the Board of Rites, probably
1473/9/1.2) This meeting occurred about one week after the audience with Son˘gjong. In the letter, which
was accepted probably by the Minister (K. P’anso;˘ senior second rank) of the Board of Rites, Ryos¯hin
related Yoshikatsu’s activities to date during the O– nin War, genealogy, and bureaucratic service.3) The
Board of Rites then forwarded the communication to Son˘gjong.
This letter is available in at least two Korean sources, the Haedong chegukki and the Son˘gjong shillok,
the veritable records for Son˘gjong’s reign. The text in the Son˘gjong shillok is entered under the same date
affixed to the text preserved in the Haedong chegukki, 1473/9/2.4) Although these versions are not iden-
tical, the differences are not significant. Historians have linked the addition of Ryos¯hin’s letter to the
Haedong chegukki to the information presented therein. Nakamura Hidetaka attributed inclusion to the
concise descriptions of Hatakeyama family matters and the fighting in Kyoto,5) Tanaka Takeo to the
description of the  O– nin War.6)
Ryos¯hin’s letter also may be found in a Japanese compilation from the Tokugawa period, the Zoku
zenrin kokuhok¯i. This compilation is a continuation of an earlier collection of letters that Japanese had
sent to and received from foreign elites.7) How the compilers came upon Ryos¯hin’s letter is unclear, but
the Haedong chegukki, which was widely available in the Tokugawa period, is a probable source. Yet,
the text preserved in the Zoku zenrin kokuhok¯i also differs from the two versions in early Choson˘-period
sources. I translate below the version of the letter preserved in the Haedong chegukki. I have chosen this
version because the letter’s inclusion in this text probably predates inclusion in these two other sources.
“The Letter Presented by Ryos¯hin,
Vice-Envoy of Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu,
on the Day of the Audience with the Board of Rites”
On this occasion, I will relate the basic origins of the great war being fought in Japan. Hosokawa
Ukyo-¯no-daibu Minamoto Katsumoto8) and Yamana Saemon-no-kami Minamoto Mochitoyo9) share the
same clan name as the Shogun.10) Bakufu officials for several generations, their families have been close
to the shoguns and have held powerful positions. Like Lian Po and Lin Xiangru of Zhao, their dispute
escalated into war because both families quarreled over power and were on bad terms for many years.11)
The country was divided in half, and the number of troops concentrated in the capital was beyond count.
The Shogun frequently issued edicts for peace, but both leaders felt that the army with the most troops
would win Japan. As the power of the armies gradually increased the country grew more difficult to
govern, and finally the entire country fell into a great war.
Katsumoto’s army is called the Eastern army, Mochitoyo’s the Western army. The names for these
armies are based on their respective bases in the eastern and western sections of the capital. The camps of
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the two armies are extremely close to each other. They were about to launch the first assaults so to decide
the winners and the losers. Suddenly, Katsumoto devised a strange strategy for his army and abruptly
surrounded the shogunal palace.12) In this way, he entered our military camp from the rear. He immedi-
ately deepened ditches and raised ramparts, and would not allow the Shogun’s palanquin or the Shogun
to leave. It was as if Mochitoyo had lost his ships in the middle of the river.
Although men who had sided with Mochitoyo threw away their armor and loosened their bowstrings
because of this and sought to surrender to the Shogun’s army, Katsumoto considered them a fifth column
and would not accept their surrender. People in the Western army who became incensed and counted
Katsumoto among their enemies increased by twice ten thousand over past times. Although this might
seem like disloyalty to their lord, they could not live without fighting. If men in the Western army were
truly prepared in their hearts to turn against their lord, even if there were one million soldiers among
them, they could not escape Heaven’s punishment. They will wait years and face their ruin.
Is the Western army not guilty of this? It is said that Zhao Dun was guilty of killing his lord although
he did not cross Jin’s border.13) In this situation, now, those armies still have not left Kyoto and are
fighting day and night. The streams of blood cause wooden pestles to float. The sounds of war drums
have called the country to battle for seven years already. Everyone, from the shoguns and lords to the
commoners, has experienced one hundred difficulties and one thousand hardships, and the country day
after day is exhausted. Why should words be sufficient to describe this? Even if the morning sun does not
disappear, naturally, the glow from the Western Army’s campfires halts the brightness.
Men who at the beginning of the war belonged to the Western army and now have surrendered to the
Eastern army are six or seven out of ten. But I have yet to hear of men who began in the Eastern army and
then joined the Western army’s gang. That is, this is the principle by which Heaven makes victorious the
people chosen to be so. If matters continue as they are now, the Western army will be crushed within no
more than one or two years.
At first, Hatakeyama Sakyo-¯no-daibu Yoshikatsu14) followed his younger cousin Hatakeyama Uemon-
no-kami Yoshinari15) and joined the Western army. Last spring, the Shogun secretly sent him a letter.
Without waiting a moment, Yoshikatsu accepted the invitation (to join the Eastern army). As a result of
this (switch to the Shogun’s army), the toll barriers in the four provinces of Echizen, Etchu,¯ Noto, and
Kaga have already been opened, and travel has become calm naturally. In Kyoto, the delivery of food is
no different from peaceful times. People have said that because the merit for bringing tranquility to these
northern provinces lies in the actions of Yoshikatsu alone, he was appointed Shogun Deputy.
The draft above is in base and unpolished language and the writing is difficult to understand.
Ashamed, my back is wet with perspiration. Although this letter is not appropriate for your perusal, the
interpreter is only able to communicate through daily conversation. Perhaps such important matters as
this are difficult to express in spoken language. For this reason, I have written this broad outline and
humbly present it to you.16)
Respectfully submitted [to the King by the Board of Rites] on the second day of the ninth month of the
year Son˘ghwa 9.17)
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Table 1 Imposter Shogun Deputies and Sitting Shogun Deputies
Sitting Shogun Deputies
Period of Service
Hatakeyama Yoshitada 1455 Hosokawa Katsumoto 1452/11/16–1464/9/21
Hatakeyama Yoshinari 1465/12 Hatakeyama Masanaga 1464/9/23–1467/1/8
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu 1470/7 Hosokawa Katsumoto 1468/7/10–1473/5/11
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu 1473/8 vacant (Katsumoto resigned on
1473/5/11)
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu 1474/12 vacant
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu 1480/7 Hatakeyama Masanaga 1477/12/25–1486/7/19
Note: The dates for periods of service are from Takayanagi Mitsutoshi and Takeuchi Rizo,¯ eds.,
Nihonshi jiten, dai-2 han, (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1474), 1095.
Sitting Shogun Deputy
Imposter Shogun
Deputies Date
Table 2 Profiles of Members of the Main Branch of the Hatakeyama
Court TitleName Dates Posts As Shogun Deputy
and Rank
Motokuni 1357–1406 Shogun Deputy 1398/6/20–1405/7/20 Uemon-no-suke,
Governor of Echizen, Junior fifth rank,
Etchu,¯ Kawachi, Kii, upper
Owari, Yamashiro,
and Noto provinces
Mitsuie 1372–1433 Shogun Deputy 1410/6/9–1412/3/16 Saemon-no-kami,
Governor of Kawachi, 1421/8/18–1429/8/24 Junior fourth rank,
Kii, Etchu,¯ Ise, section lower
of Yamato, and
Yamashiro provinces
Mochikuni 1398–1455 Shogun Deputy 1442/6/29–1445/3/24 Saemon-no-kami,
Governor of Kawachi, 1449/10/5–1452/11/16 Junior fourth rank,
Kii, Etchu,¯ section of lower
Yamato, and
Yamashiro provinces
Yoshinari 1437 (?)–1490 Governor of Kawachi, Uemon-no-suke,
Kii, Etchu,¯ section of Junior fifth rank,
Yamato, and upper
Yamashiro provinces
Motoie ?–1499 Governor of Kawachi, Danjo-¯no-shohitsu,
Kii, and Etchu¯ Senior fifth rank,
provinces lower
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Table 4 Profiles of Members of the Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama
Shogun DeputyName Dates Post(s)
as of Court Title and Rank
Yoshitada ? Shogun Deputy 1455 Shur¯i-no-daibu,
Junior fourth rank, lower;
Uemon-no-suke, Junior fifth
rank, upper
Motokuni ? ? ? ?
Yoshinari ? Shogun Deputy 1465, 1466, 1474 Ukingo-no-kami,
Governor of Yamashiro, Junior fourth rank, lower
Kawachi, Kii, Etchu,¯
and Noto provinces
Yoshikatsu ? Shogun Deputy 1470, 1473, 1474, Sakyo-¯no-daibu,
1480 Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshikata ? ? ? Ukingo-no-kami,
Junior fourth rank, lower
Haruhide ? ? ? Hyoe¯-no-kami,
Junior fourth rank, lower
Table 3 Profiles of Members of the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama
Period of Court TitleName Dates Post Appointment and Rank
Mitsunori 1372– Governor of Noto 1406–1432 Shur¯i-no-daibu,
1432/6/27 province Junior fourth rank,
lower
Yoshitada ?–1463/8/21 Governor of Noto 1432–1455 Shur¯i-no-daibu,
province Junior fourth rank,
lower
Yoshiari ?–1440 (?) Jibu-no-shou,
Junior fifth rank,
lower
Yoshimune ?–1497/8/20 Governor of Noto 1455 (1478?)–1497 Saemon-no-suke,
province Junior fifth rank,
upper
